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SOVEREIGN DEBT RESTRUCTURING OPTIONS:
AN ANALYTICAL COMPARISON
STEVEN L. SCHWARCZ*
The recent financial woes of Greece, Ireland, Portugal, and other nations
have reinvigorated the debate over whether to bail out defaulting countries or,
instead, restructure their debt. Bailouts are expensive, both for residents of the
nation being bailed out and for parties providing the bailout funds. Because the
IMF, which is subsidized by most nations (including the United States), is almost
always involved in country debt bailouts, we all share the burden. Yet bailouts
are virtually inevitable under the existing international framework; defaults are
likely to have systemic consequences, whereas an orderly debt restructuring is
currently impractical. This Article analyzes and compares debt restructuring al-
ternatives to bailouts. Under a free-market option, sovereign debtors and their
creditors attempt to consensually negotiate a debt restructuring, aided by collec-
tive-action clauses and by exchange offers with exit consents. Under a statutory
option, sovereign debtors and their creditors would be bound by an interna-
tional convention that sets forth a process to facilitate debt restructuring. The
absence of any systematic comparison of these options has made it difficult to
facilitate country debt restructurings. This Article attempts to provide that
comparison.
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INTRODUCTION
The recent financial woes of Greece, Ireland, Portugal, and other na-
tions have reinvigorated the debate over whether to bail out defaulting coun-
tries or, instead, restructure their debt. In Greece, for example,1 the debate
has been highlighted by scenes worthy of a Sophoclean tragedy, as protes-
tors fought tear gas and riot police on the streets of Athens.2 And just days
before a June 2011 vote of confidence in parliament, Greek citizens, through
a nationwide strike, displayed their indignation at bailout terms imposing
harsh austerity measures and requiring their country to sell off state assets.3
Bailouts are expensive not only in human terms. The initial Greek bailout
costing $110 billion in 2010 eventually needed to be supplemented by $85
billion in bailout funds.4 Although the European Union and the International
Monetary Fund (IMF) have been underwriting the Greek bailout, the IMF’s
payment is funded by all IMF member-nations—the United States, for ex-
ample, provides 17% of IMF funding5—so many nations are sharing in the
burden.6
A Greek debt bailout was virtually inevitable because a default was
believed to have the potential to bring down the world financial system,7
1 Although Greece is a dramatic example of a nation with debt problems, it may not be a
representative example. See, e.g., infra note 7 (observing two features that make Greece unrep- R
resentative: the widespread exposure of European banks to Greek debt and Greece’s inability
to devalue its currency due to being part of the Eurozone). This Article engages the question of
sovereign debt restructuring more generally.
2 Cf. Buttonwood, Greece, Default and Public Unrest: The Cost of Denial, ECONOMIST
(June 16, 2011, 8:17 AM), http://www.economist.com/blogs/buttonwood/2011/06/greece-de-
fault-and-public-unrest (but also noting that, despite widespread news coverage of violent
protestors, most activists have voiced concerns peacefully).
3 See The Euro Crisis: A Second Wave, ECONOMIST, June 18, 2011, at 29.
4 Id. The predictive value of the historically low default rate on the repayment of bailout
loans (at least those made by the IMF) is doubtful because “bad” debt has usually been rolled
over rather than being considered in default. See Olivier Jeanne & Jeromin Zettelmeyer, Inter-
national Bailouts, Moral Hazard, and Conditionality, 16 ECON. POL’Y 408, 415 (2001).
5 Sudeep Reddy, Obama and IMF Step Up Efforts to Contain Debt Woes, WALL ST. J.,
Dec. 3, 2011, at A12.
6 Nor are IMF payments made to bail out IMF member-nations necessarily profitable in-
vestments for the other IMF member-nations. Member-nations earn interest on their deposits
in the IMF, but repayment by the IMF, although anticipated, is not assured. Furthermore, the
IMF pays member-nations less than a market rate of interest on their deposits. See Steven L.
Schwarcz, “Idiot’s Guide” to Sovereign Debt Restructuring, 53 EMORY L.J. 1189, 1195–96
(2004) [hereinafter Schwarcz, Idiot’s Guide].
7 Two factors exacerbate the potential for systemic contagion from a Greek debt default:
the widespread exposure of banks across Europe to Greek debt, see Megan Murphy et al.,
Greek Contagion Fears Spread to Other EU Banks, FIN. TIMES, June 15, 2011, available at
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/ac918946-975a-11e0-9c9d-00144feab49a.html, and Greece’s in-
ability to devalue its currency due to being part of the Eurozone. See Natascha Gewaltig,
Greece’s Painful Choice, BUS. WEEK, Feb. 19, 2010, available at http://www.businessweek.
com/investor/content/feb2010/pi20100218_722508.htm. But any default of a nation with sig-
nificant amounts of debt can trigger contagion not only by directly impacting the nation’s
creditors but also by impacting parties, often unknown ex ante, that have hedged the nation’s
debt through credit-default swaps and other derivative products. In the case of Greece, for
example, derivatives further complicated policymakers’ decisions by blurring the consequences
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whereas an orderly debt restructuring was impractical. This is a growing
problem. As global capital markets increasingly (and inevitably) embrace
sovereign bonds,8 the potential for a nation’s debt default to trigger a larger
systemic collapse increases as these relationships become even more tightly
linked.9
That in turn gives rise to a phenomenon often viewed as limited to large
banks—the problem of “too big to fail.” A bank whose default could trigger
an economic domino effect is, or at least may be perceived to be, too big to
fail. Therefore, it may need to be bailed out by public funds. This can foster
moral hazard: anticipating a bailout, the bank may lack incentive to take a
prudent economic course.10 Likewise, nations—even those as small as
Greece—can be seen as too big to fail if their default could trigger a wider
economic collapse. That too can foster moral hazard; indeed, sovereigns are
more likely to engage in morally hazardous behavior than banks, which can
be liquidated.11 The Greek government, for example, did little to impose fis-
cal austerity even as debts accumulated.12
This Article analyzes and compares debt restructuring alternatives to
bailouts.13 This inquiry is important not only because of the current sover-
eign debt crisis. The problem of sovereign debt constantly reoccurs—for
centuries, “repeated sovereign default[s] [have been] the norm throughout
of those decisions. See Louise Story, Derivatives Cloud the Possible Fallout from a Greek
Default, N.Y. TIMES, June 22, 2011, at B1.
8 See, e.g., INT’L MONETARY FUND, PROPOSALS FOR A SOVEREIGN DEBT RESTRUCTURING
MECHANISM (2003), http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/sdrm.htm [hereinafter SDRM]
(“In recent years countries have turned increasingly from bank loans to bond issues to raise
capital . . . . [T]his is beneficial [because] the international capital markets are more diversi-
fied and function more efficiently . . . [having] a broader investor base available to provide
financing for emerging market sovereigns, which has helped diversify risk.”).
9 Sovereign bonds also greatly increase the number of creditors, which exacerbates the
“hold-out” problem described infra text accompanying notes 17–23. See, e.g., SDRM, supra R
note 8 (observing that the increase in sovereign bonds has caused “private creditors [to] be- R
come increasingly numerous, anonymous and difficult to coordinate”).
10 Moral hazard more generally refers to the tendency of persons who are protected from
the consequences of risky behavior to engage in such behavior.
11 At least some sovereigns do little to hide their awareness of being seen as too big to fail.
Evangelos Venizelos, Greece’s finance minister, suggested to European policy makers in late
June 2011, for example, that the European market needed an orderly restructuring of Greece’s
debt much more than did Greece. See Charlemagne, Default Options, ECONOMIST, June 25,
2011, at 68. Mr. Venizelos’ statement poignantly reflects Keynes’s astute and oft-quoted apho-
rism that “‘[i]f I owe you a pound, I have a problem; but if I owe you a million, the problem
is yours.’” Id.
12 See, e.g., Greece’s Budget Crisis: Papandreou Tries to Prop Up the Pillars, ECONO-
MIST, Dec. 19, 2009, at 48.
13 This Article presumes that the sovereign debt in question has been legitimately incurred
and that repayment is not based on any determination of the morality of the debt. Cf. Caroline
M. Gentile, The Market for Odious Debt, 73 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 151, 151 (2010)
(describing odious debts as “debts incurred by a dictatorial regime for its own benefit with the
knowledge of the creditors, but without the consent of the nation’s citizens,” which, on that
basis, may later be declared “unlawful” and thus not require repayment).
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every region in the world”14—sometimes with devastating consequences for
the defaulting nation15 and sometimes for the world.16
I. ALTERNATIVES TO BAILOUTS
A. Debt Restructuring
There are at least two potential debt restructuring alternatives to
bailouts, one contractual, or “free market,” and the other statutory. To un-
derstand these alternatives, it is necessary to understand the hold-out prob-
lem. This is a classic collective action problem: in any debt restructuring,
one or more creditors may strategically hold out from agreeing to a reasona-
ble debt restructuring plan. The hold-outs hope either that they will receive
full payment of their claims or that the imperative of other creditors to settle
will persuade those creditors to allocate the hold-outs more than their fair
share of the settlement.17
At least in the sovereign debt context, courts have upheld this type of
hold-out behavior. In Allied Bank International v. Banco Credito Agricola
de Cartago,18 a member of a bank syndicate that refused to join a restructur-
ing agreement between Costa Rican sovereign debtors and other syndicate
members sued in the United States for repayment of its defaulted loan.19 The
court granted summary judgment in favor of the hold-out bank on the basis
that the loan was clearly due and payable, notwithstanding Costa Rica’s uni-
lateral regulation suspending its external debt payments.20 Similarly, in Elli-
ott Associates v. Banco de la Nacion,21 the hold-out was a vulture fund (a
fund that invests in distressed debt) that had bought debt of two government-
guaranteed Peruvian banks at a deep discount. The fund then received, but
14 Carmen M. Reinhart & Kenneth S. Rogoff, This Time is Different: A Panoramic View of
Eight Centuries of Financial Crises 5, 53 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No.
13882, 2008), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w13882 (also observing that it “may be
premature” to “celebrat[e]” the view that nations and creditors have learned from past
mistakes).
15 See id. at 12 (observing that, due to debt defaults, Newfoundland lost its sovereignty
and ultimately became a province of Canada, and Egypt became a British protectorate).
16 See supra text accompanying notes 7–9 (discussing the risk of global financial conta- R
gion from a sovereign debt default); see also Mardi Dungey et al., International Contagion
Effects from the Russian Crisis and the LTCM Near-Collapse (Int’l Monetary Fund Working
Paper, No. WP/02/74, 2002), available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2002/wp
0274.pdf (discussing the feared systemic consequences if, precipitated by the 1998 Russian
Federation debt default, Long-Term Capital Management collapsed).
17 See Schwarcz, Idiot’s Guide, supra note 6, at 1193. A hold-out may also hope that other R
creditors will purchase the hold-out’s claim. Id. The average hold-out is more likely to want a
settlement than to want to ultimately litigate for full payment because of the high cost of
litigation, especially against a sovereign debtor. Lee C. Buchheit & G. Mitu Gulati, Exit Con-
sents in Sovereign Bond Exchanges, 48 UCLA L. REV. 59, 60 n.2 (2000).
18 757 F.2d 516 (2d Cir. 1985).
19 See id. at 519.
20 See id. at 522–23.
21 194 F.3d 363 (2d Cir. 1999).
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refused to participate in, an offer to exchange that debt for new bonds. When
Elliott Associates sued Peru for payment, Elliott was granted judgment on
appeal, but the parties ultimately settled.22
The hold-out problem can severely impede a “bilateral” debt restruc-
turing, that is, one negotiated between a sovereign debtor and its creditors.
On a practical level, the hold-out problem motivates creditors to refuse in the
first instance to agree to a reasonable restructuring plan. Perhaps more sig-
nificantly, the very existence of hold-outs can undermine the willingness of
other creditors to agree to a reasonable restructuring plan.23 The first task of
any sovereign debt restructuring scheme should therefore be to help solve
the hold-out problem.24
Both free-market and statutory options for sovereign debt restructuring
can address the hold-out problem. Under a free-market debt restructuring
option, the hold-out problem would be addressed through the inclusion of
so-called “collective-action clauses” (CACs) in financing agreements. Any
bilateral debt restructuring plan25 is likely to need to include changes to es-
sential payment terms, such as delaying debt repayment maturities, reducing
amounts of principal, or reducing interest rates.26 Financing agreements often
require unanimous consent of the parties to make these types of changes.27
The essential payment terms of financing agreements that include CACs can
be amended, however, with the consent of a supermajority, as opposed to all,
of the creditors party to that agreement.28 Hold-outs are thus bound to terms
22 Schwarcz, Idiot’s Guide, supra note 6, at 1193 n.14. R
23 See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr. & William A. Klein, Bondholder Coercion: The Problem
of Constrained Choice in Debt Tender Offers and Recapitalizations, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 1207,
1223 (1991) (“One bondholder’s opportunistic behavior may dissuade the other bondholders
from engaging in collective action because they fear they will be exploited by those that hold
out or otherwise defect from their coalition.”).
24 There are indications that Eurozone sovereign debt is not currently subject to a signifi-
cant hold-out problem because most of the debt is now being held by the European Central
Bank and large German banks. See John Dizard, Why Speculators Shun Euro Sovereign Debt,
FIN. TIMES, Feb. 28, 2011, at 5. That situation could change rapidly, though, if (for example)
one or more existing holders sell their debt to more aggressive investors. Moreover, this Arti-
cle engages the sovereign debt problem in a context broader than the current Eurozone.
25 Unless the context requires otherwise, references in this Article to free-market debt
restructuring will mean bilateral free-market debt restructuring, as opposed to a technically
“free market” debt restructuring unilaterally imposed by a debtor nation.
26 See Schwarcz, Idiot’s Guide, supra note 6, at 1193. R
27 Barry Eichengreen & Ashoka Mody, Do Collective Action Clauses Raise Borrowing
Costs?, 114 ECON. J. 247, 247–48 (2004) (noting that financing agreements governed by U.S.,
German, or Japanese law, which constitute approximately two-thirds of emerging market debt,
usually require unanimous consent for modification of essential payment terms, whereas fi-
nancing agreements governed by U.K. or Luxembourg law often have collective-action clauses
for modification of essential payment terms).
28 See, e.g., BARRY EICHENGREEN, TOWARDS A NEW INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL ARCHI-
TECTURE: A PRACTICAL POST-ASIA AGENDA 65–70 (1999); Christopher Greenwood & Hugh
Mercer, Considerations of International Law, in CRISIS? WHAT CRISIS? ORDERLY WORKOUTS
FOR SOVEREIGN DEBTORS 110 (Barry Eichengreen & Richard Portes eds., 1995); Buchheit &
Gulati, supra note 17, at 68. R
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negotiated by that supermajority, making it much easier to successfully ne-
gotiate a bilateral debt restructuring plan.29
CACs can be included in sovereign financing agreements at the time
they are originally executed. When CACs are not already included, a sover-
eign debtor can attempt to later include them by engaging in exchange offers
with exit consents—effectively replacing existing debt claims with debt se-
curities governed by CACs.30
Because no international convention establishing a statutory framework
for sovereign debt restructuring currently exists,31 current sovereign debt re-
structuring efforts take place entirely under the free-market option.32
Under a statutory debt restructuring option, the hold-out problem would
be addressed by an international treaty or convention (the terms being sy-
nonymous)33 that binds sovereign debtors and their creditors to a process to
facilitate debt restructuring. The most well-known example is the so-called
sovereign debt restructuring mechanism (SDRM), proposed by the IMF.34 A
predecessor sovereign debt restructuring convention (SDRC) has also been
proposed in the academic literature.35 Because neither the SDRM nor the
SDRC (nor any other international debt restructuring convention) has yet
been put into force under international law, no sovereign debt restructuring
efforts have yet taken place under the statutory option.36
Scholars and commentators have not yet been able to agree on which
sovereign debt restructuring option—free-market or statutory—is preferable.
29 See Schwarcz, Idiot’s Guide, supra note 6, at 1197–98. R
30 See Buchheit & Gulati, supra note 17, at 65–66. For further detail on how exchange R
offers with exit consents would work, see infra text accompanying notes 65–73. R
31 Article 2.1(a) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties defines a treaty as “an
international agreement concluded between States in written form and governed by interna-
tional law . . . whatever its particular designation.” Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties,
art. 2.1(a), May 23, 1969, 1115 U.N.T.S. 331 (emphasis added). Cf. HOLGER SCHIER, TO-
WARDS A REORGANISATION SYSTEM FOR SOVEREIGN DEBT: AN INTERNATIONAL LAW PERSPEC-
TIVE 49 (2007) (using the terms convention and treaty interchangeably).
32 SCHIER, supra note 31, at 49 (citing Rudolf Dolzer, Staatliche Zahlungsunfahigkeit: R
Zum Begriff und zu den Rechtsfolgen im Vo¨lkerrecht, in DES MENSCHEN RECHT ZWISCHEN
FREIHEIT UND VERANTWORTUNG [State Insolvency: Concept and Legal Consequences in Inter-
national Law, in HUMAN RIGHTS BETWEEN FREEDOM AND RESPONSIBILITY] 540 (Ju¨rgen
Jekewitz ed., 1989).
33 See supra text accompanying note 31. R
34 See SDRM, supra note 8. Because a formal statutory version of the SDRM was never R
finalized, references in this Article to provisions of the SDRM will refer to the “Proposed
Features of a Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism” in the Attachment to INT’L MONE-
TARY FUND, PROPOSED FEATURES OF A SOVEREIGN DEBT RESTRUCTURING MECHANISM (2003),
available at http://www.imf.org/external/np/pdr/sdrm/2003/021203.pdf.
35 See Schwarcz, Idiot’s Guide, supra note 6, app. 1, at 1215–18 [hereinafter SDRC]. The R
SDRC was itself based on the Proposed Model Convention in Steven L. Schwarcz, Sovereign
Debt Restructuring: A Bankruptcy Reorganization Approach, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 956,
1020–22, app. 1 (2000) [hereinafter Schwarcz, Bankruptcy Reorganization Approach].
36 See supra note 32.
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The lack of consensus can be explained, at least in part, by the paucity of
systematic comparison of these options.37 This Article seeks to fill that gap.
Such a comparison will better inform the question of whether sovereign
debt restructuring efforts should continue to take place entirely under the
free-market option or whether there should also be an effort to promote an
international convention that could facilitate the statutory option as a supple-
ment to, or a replacement for, the free-market option.38
B. Other Alternatives
This Article focuses on bilateral debt restructuring and thus does not
examine in depth other possible alternatives to bailouts. For example, a sov-
ereign nation could attempt to unilaterally restructure its debt—effectively
defaulting on its debt while dictating new payment terms to creditors. Unlike
corporations and other non-sovereign debtors, which generally cannot unilat-
erally avoid their debt obligations without enforcement consequences a sov-
ereign nation can, and sometimes does, de facto refuse to pay a debt or at
least defer its payment to a later date.39 The nation may well suffer reputa-
tional consequences, and any national assets (such as ships or airplanes)
outside the nation’s jurisdiction might be able to be seized.40 But there cur-
37 See, e.g., Leszek Balcerowicz, Sovereign Bankruptcy in the European Union in the
Comparative Perspective 10–12 (Peterson Inst. for Int’l Econ., Working Paper No. WP 10-18,
2010) (observing that arguments put forward by proponents of the statutory option “are rarely
based on a careful comparative analysis of the proposed SDRM with the other already existing
debt resolution mechanisms”). The comparative analyses are few. See, e.g., Patrick Bolton,
Toward a Statutory Approach to Sovereign Debt Restructuring: Lessons from Corporate Bank-
ruptcy Practice Around the World, 50 IMF ECON. REV. 41 (2003) (arguing that key elements
of various corporate bankruptcy codes offer useful insights applicable at the global sovereign
level and discussing whether a statutory option such as the SDRM or a more market-based
contracts option is preferable); Jonathan Sedlak, Sovereign Debt Restructuring: Statutory Re-
form or Contractual Solution?, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 1483 (2004) (comparing statutory and
market-based options for sovereign debt restructuring in light of U.S. resistance to a statutory
option). Previously, I have written a partial comparative analysis and a fanciful comparative
analysis. See, respectively, Schwarcz, Idiot’s Guide, supra note 6, at 1203–06; Steven L. R
Schwarcz, Looking Forward: 2005–2010 A Sovereign Debt Restructuring Reverie, 6 U. CHI. J.
INT’L L. 381 (2005).
38 Cf. Natasha Brereton, BOE: Debt Woes Need “Comprehensive” Solution, WALL ST. J.,
Dec. 17, 2010, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142405274870403480457602
5100276111250.html (observing that the Bank of England has called for a comprehensive
approach to sovereign debt restructuring).
39 See, e.g., Allied Bank Int’l. v. Banco Credito Agricola de Cartago, 757 F.2d 516 (2d Cir.
1985) (referencing Costa Rica’s unilateral regulation suspending its external debt payments);
Sovereign Default and Recovery Rates 1983–2009, MOODY’S INVESTORS SERVICE ex. 7, app.1
(2010), http://www.moodys.com/researchdocumentcontentpage.aspx?docid=PBC_124389
(documenting various unilateral refusals to pay or payment deferrals of sovereign debt, includ-
ing by Argentina in 2001 and by Russia in 1998). Cf. Schwarcz, Bankruptcy Reorganization
Approach, supra note 35, at 1020 (observing that the power of a nation to force a unilateral R
debt restructuring represents an implicit threat that is likely to motivate creditors to engage in a
consensual restructuring).
40 Sovereign nation funds often cannot be located or easily identified, forcing creditors to
creatively seek out other assets that can be seized outside the debtor nation. David Bosco, The
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rently is no international law mechanism designed to enforce payment of the
debt if the nation’s internal legal system fails to honor foreign enforcement
efforts, nor do there appear to be any economic or other sanctions that can
effectively be imposed on the nation.41
Because unilateral debt restructuring is merely default cloaked in se-
mantics, it could pose the same threat of systemic risk as any other manifes-
tation of default. Furthermore, given anticipated creditor opposition, any
unilateral restructuring attempt could well be disorderly, generating multiple
lawsuits.42 I therefore regard unilateral debt restructuring by a sovereign
debtor as a normatively undesirable alternative to a bailout.43
Another way to avoid bailouts is to institute a sovereign debt system
that ex ante minimizes the chance of default.44 How such a system might be
structured, however, is beyond this Article’s scope.45
The Article next focuses on comparing the free-market and statutory
options for sovereign debt restructuring.46
Debt Frenzy, 161 FOREIGN POL’Y 36, 40–41 (2007). These efforts, however, have largely been
unsuccessful. See, e.g., Seijas v. Republic of Argentina, 391 F. App’x 901, 902 (2d Cir. 2010)
(failed attempt to seize U.S.-located airplanes of a nationalized commercial airline).
41 SCHIER, supra note 32, at 203–05 (discussing potential sanctions and their limitations). R
Although some creditors have attempted to use foreign court judgments against a debtor nation
as leverage, see infra note 111, that has proved relatively ineffective as a means of forcing R
debtor nations to pay those creditors. Faisal Z. Ahmed et al., Lawsuits and Empire: On the
Enforcement of Sovereign Debt in Latin America, 73 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 39, 42–46
(2010).
42 See Anna Gelpern, What Bond Markets Can Learn from Argentina, 24 INT’L FIN. L.
REV. 19, 21 (2005) (noting that Argentina faced thousands of lawsuits, including dozens in
New York and over a hundred in Europe, during and after its unilateral debt restructuring).
43 The ultimate power of a nation to force a unilateral debt restructuring nonetheless repre-
sents an implicit threat that, like a consensual debt restructuring in the shadow of bankruptcy
law, is likely to motivate creditors to engage in a consensual debt restructuring. Cf. Schwarcz,
Bankruptcy Reorganization Approach, supra note 35, at 1020 (comparing corporate debt re- R
structuring under the “shadow of bankruptcy law” with sovereign debt restructuring).
44 Balcerowicz, supra note 37, at 13. R
45 For an assessment of ex ante and ex post approaches to financial regulation, see gener-
ally Steven L. Schwarcz, Ex Ante Versus Ex Post Approaches to Financial Regulation, CHAP-
MAN L. REV. (forthcoming 2012), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1748007 (providing an
overview of the ex ante versus ex post regulatory dichotomy).
46 These are the primary bilateral sovereign debt restructuring options. Although commen-
tators have advanced other options, they do not purport to be nearly as comprehensive. For
example, Banque de France and the International Institute of Finance have suggested that sov-
ereign nations and their creditors could attempt to restructure debt pursuant to voluntary codes
of conduct. See Nouriel Roubini & Brad Setser, Improving the Sovereign Debt Restructuring
Process: Problems in Restructuring, Proposed Solutions, and a Roadmap for Reform 10 (2003)
(unpublished manuscript), http://www.iie.com/publications/papers/roubini-setser0303.pdf.
These codes could set forth aspirational goals, such as facilitating early and regular dialogue
between nations and their creditors, sharing of information, treating creditors fairly, condition-
ing any debt restructuring on economic reform, and mediating disputes. See Bertrand Couil-
lault & Pierre-Franc¸ois Weber, Towards a Voluntary Code of Good Conduct for Sovereign
Debt Restructuring, 2 FIN. STABILITY REV. 154, 157–60 (2003). Similarly, some have pro-
posed that nations could include arbitration clauses in their debt contracts to resolve debt
restructuring disputes. Allan L. Gropper, U.S. Bankr. Judge, S.D.N.Y, Presentation at the Elev-
enth Annual Conference of the International Insolvency Institute (June 13, 2011) (on file with
author). Because arbitration clauses would be limited to consenting creditors, they would ef-
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II. ANALYSIS
A. Defining the Options
In order to compare free-market and statutory options, one must first
clearly define each option. As previously discussed, the free-market option
is contractual. It attempts to address the hold-out problem through CACs—
whether those clauses are originally included in financing agreements or
later included through exchange offers with exit consents.47
The statutory option has at least two possible models: the SDRM and
the SDRC.48 The main provisions of the SDRM and the SDRC are nonethe-
less functionally equivalent. Both attempt to address the hold-out problem
through supermajority voting.49 Both also attempt to address the funding
problem of sovereign debt restructuring50—that a nation is likely to need to
borrow new money to pay critical expenses during the debt restructuring
process, but no lender is likely to be willing to lend such funds unless its
right to repayment has priority over existing debt claims.51 Furthermore, both
allow debtor nations to voluntarily decide whether to apply the provisions to
their debt problems.52
These key similarities should not be a surprise: the SDRM is based on
the same research that generated the SDRC.53 Differences between the
SDRM and the SDRC are mostly in the details. For example, the SDRM
excludes claims from foreign governments,54 whereas the SDRC allows such
claims but provides that such claims each constitutes its own separate class.55
The SDRM requires the debtor nation to decide in advance which debts to
restructure thereunder and which debts, if any, to either not restructure or to
restructure outside the SDRM,56 whereas the SDRC allows the debtor nation
fectively only bind, at most, a debtor nation and its principal creditors. Id. Moreover, arbitra-
tion clauses do not, by themselves, set forth the principles pursuant to which the debt should be
restructured. Id.
47 See supra text accompanying notes 18–30 ; see also SCHIER, supra note 32, at 19 (ob- R
serving primary reliance of promoters of the contractual option on CACs and exit consents).
48 See supra text accompanying notes 34–35. R
49 See SDRM § 9; SDRC Art. 7.
50 See SDRM § 10; SDRC Arts. 8–10.
51 See, e.g., Patrick Bolton & David A. Skeel, Jr., Redesigning the International Lender of
Last Resort, 6 CHI. J. INT’L L. 177, 186–87 (2005) (explaining the difficulty a nation has
obtaining financing during a debt restructuring).
52 Article 3(1) of the SDRC triggers that convention’s application by the debtor nation
“filing a voluntary petition for relief.” SDRM § 4 states that “[c]onsistent with the principle
of sovereignty, the mechanism could only be activated at the initiative of a member.”
53 See, e.g., Bolton, supra note 37, at 41 (observing that “[t]he IMF’s (2001 and 2002) R
recent proposals for the introduction of [the SDRM] . . . build on perceptive early policy
proposals by academics”); Kenneth Rogoff & Jeromin Zettelmeyer, Bankruptcy Procedures
for Sovereigns: A History of Ideas, 1976–2001, 49 IMF ECON. REV. 470 (2002) (discussing the
conceptual origins of the SDRM).
54 SDRM § 3(d)(vi).
55 SDRC Art. 7(3)(b).
56 SDRM § 5.
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to decide how to restructure its debts at the time that it files its debt restruc-
turing plan.57 The only superficially significant difference is that the SDRM,
unlike the SDRC, includes a procedure that could implement a temporary
stay on litigation against the sovereign.58 This stay does not appear essential,
however, because of the sovereignty of debtor nations and the limited ability
of creditors to seize national assets, even those that may be located outside
of a debtor nation.59 Even the IMF’s principal advocate for the SDRM admit-
ted that a temporary stay was not essential to prevent a “grab race” against a
debtor nation’s assets.60
Because of the key similarities between the SDRM and the SDRC, I
will define the statutory option as one in which sovereign debtors and their
creditors are bound by an international convention that sets forth a process to
facilitate debt restructuring by addressing the hold-out problem and the
funding problem.61 To this end, Appendix I suggests a Model Sovereign
Debt Restructuring Convention (hereinafter, the “Model Convention”). Arti-
cles 5–7 of the Model Convention attempt to address the hold-out problem
through supermajority voting. Articles 8–9 of the Model Convention attempt
to address the funding problem. And Article 3 of the Model Convention
allows debtor nations to voluntarily decide whether to apply the Conven-
tion’s provisions to their debt problems. Appendix II sets forth a highly sim-
plified illustration of how the Convention might be applied.
B. Analysis of the Free-Market Option
The free-market option focuses on solving the hold-out problem. Under
the most straightforward model of this option, sovereign debtors and their
creditors would include CACs in their financing agreements, allowing even
57 SDRC Art. 6(2).
58 SDRM § 7; see also ANNE O. KRUEGER, INT’L MONETARY FUND, A NEW APPROACH TO
SOVEREIGN DEBT RESTRUCTURING 15–16 (2002), available at http://www.imf.org/external/
pubs/ft/exrp/sdrm/eng/sdrm.pdf (proposing a temporary stay).
59 See supra text accompanying note 40 (observing that creditor efforts to seize national R
assets located outside of debtor nations have been largely unsuccessful). Commentators also
have suggested other possible variations for a statutory approach. See, e.g., Hal S. Scott, A
Bankruptcy Procedure for Sovereign Debtors?, 37 INT’L L. 103, 108–09 (2003) (advocating
using a cram-down mechanism, minimizing the role of the IMF, and instituting a floor debt
valuation that could not be passed in the restructuring).
60 KRUEGER, supra note 58, at 15–16. Dr. Krueger, who was First Deputy Managing Di- R
rector of the IMF from 2001–2006, argued for a temporary stay primarily on the basis that
litigation could inhibit negotiations while a state was making use of the SDRM. Id.
61 In response to the recent European sovereign debt problems, commentators have pro-
posed adoption of a European Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism (“E-SDRM”). See,
e.g., Jacob Funk Kirkegaard, Will It Be Brussels, Berlin, or Financial Markets that Check
Moral Hazard in Europe’s Bailout Union? Most Likely the Latter! 13–15 (Peterson Inst. for
Int’l Econ., Pol’y Brief. PB 10–25, 2010); Shahin Valle´e & Je´re´mie Cohen-Setton, Towards a
Eurozone Governance Overhaul, FIN. TIMES (Jul. 16, 2010, 10:02 PM), http://ftalphaville.ft.
com/blog/2010/07/16/289421/guest-post-towards-a-eurozone-governance-overhaul. But the E-
SDRM would be conceptually similar to the SDRM (and thus to the SDRC). See Kirkegaard,
supra, at 13.
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essential payment terms in a financing agreement to be changed through
supermajority, as opposed to unanimous, voting of the creditors.62 There are,
however, two fundamental limitations to CACs. The first is that CACs are
not always included in sovereign financing agreements. In the Greek debt
crisis, for example, ninety percent of the total debt was not governed by
CACs.63 Indeed, since 2003 there has been a “quiet revival of unanimous
consent,” with at least four nations issuing sovereign debt requiring unani-
mous consent to change certain significant provisions.64
Although parties could consider agreeing during (or at the outset of) a
crisis to include CAC clauses in their financing agreements, that can be diffi-
cult to accomplish.65 The most viable means of accomplishing this is for a
sovereign debtor to engage in exchange offers with exit consents.66 The sov-
ereign would, for example, offer its creditors the option of exchanging their
debt claims for new debt securities that include CACs. To try to induce all
creditors to agree to the exchange, consenting creditors would be required to
waive any covenant protections in their financing agreements that can be
waived without unanimous creditor consent.67 Creditors who do not submit
to the exchange might therefore find those covenant protections gone if a
sufficient majority of creditors consent.68
Ecuador, for example, used this strategy in its 2000 debt restructuring,69
reducing its bond debt by approximately forty percent.70 In at least one bond
issue, “holders of approximately 97% of the eligible existing bonds had
agreed to tender their bonds in the exchange.”71 The consenting bondholders
62 See supra text accompanying note 28. R
63 Stephen J. Choi et al., Pricing Terms in Sovereign Debt Contracts: A Greek Case Study
with Implications for the European Crisis Resolution Mechanism 2, 12 (Univ. of Chi., John M.
Olin Law & Economics Working Paper No. 541, 2010), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1713914.
64 Anna Gelpern & Mitu Gulati, Innovation After the Revolution: Foreign Sovereign Bond
Contracts Since 2003, 4 CAP. MKTS. L.J. 85, 99 (2008).
65 Schwarcz, Idiot’s Guide, supra note 6, at 1203. R
66 See Buchheit & Gulati, supra note 17, at 82–83. R
67 Although a sovereign might offer payment as an incentive to persuade creditors to agree
to the exchange, the exit consent route has been the most viable method of compelling an
exchange agreement. Id. at 72–73. Using payment as an incentive, however, would be unlikely
to raise the enforceability questions associated with exit consents. Compare infra text accom-
panying note 73, with Kass v. E. Air Lines, Inc., No. 8700, 1986 Del. Ch. LEXIS 486 (Nov. R
14, 1986) (upholding changes to a nonpayment term in bond indentures when borrower offered
payments to bondholders who voted for the amendment).
68 See Buchheit & Gulati, supra note 17, at 65–66. R
69 MOODY’S INVESTORS SERVICE, SOVEREIGN RESTRUCTURINGS: PUTTING TOO MUCH
FAITH IN EXIT CONSENTS 11 (2001).
70 Lee C. Buchheit, How Ecuador Escaped the Brady Bond Trap, 19 INT’L FIN. L. REV. 17,
19 (2000) (stating that this strategy enabled Ecuador to reduce its “aggregate Brady bond and
Eurobond debt stock . . . by about 40%” in net present value and par value terms). The ex-
change “resulted in cash-flow savings . . . of approximately $1.5 billion over the first five
years” compared to the original bond terms. Id.
71 Id.
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signed exit amendments to remove covenants and cross-default clauses from
the bond indentures, thereby prejudicing bondholders who did not consent.72
Questions remain, however, of the extent to which this strategy (i.e.,
penalizing creditors who do not submit to an exchange offer) represents un-
enforceable coercion.73 Furthermore, exchange offers are not always suc-
cessful.74 Although the successful completion of exchange offers in the
Ukraine, Pakistan, and Ecuador “is often cited as providing support” for the
contractual option,75 these exchange offers “took place in small countries
with extremely simple debt structures” and thus are not regarded as necessa-
rily representative of exchange offers engaged in by larger countries with
more debt or more complex debt.76 Ecuador, for example, had $6 billion in
outstanding debt during its 2000 restructuring,77 whereas Greece’s debt bur-
den in 2011 was over $300 billion.78 The success of those exchange offers
also stands in contrast to the failure of a proposed exchange offer in Russia.79
The second limitation to CACs is that even if every sovereign financing
agreement included CACs, whether ab initio or through exchange offers,
such clauses (being contractual) would most likely work on an agreement-
by-agreement basis.80 Therefore, any one or more syndicate of banks or
group of bondholders that fails to achieve a supermajority vote would itself
be a hold-out vis-a`-vis other creditors.81 For example, assume that State X
has a $300 million bank-lending syndicate, a $400 million bond issue, and a
$500 million bond issue. Assume the bank-lending syndicate’s credit agree-
72 See id. at 20.
73 See, e.g., Michael M. Chamberlain, At the Frontier of Exit Consents, Remarks at the
Bear Stearns & EMCA Sovereign Creditors Rights Conference (Nov. 8, 2001) (noting that
“[s]ome bond terms (notably governing law, right of acceleration for non-payment, waiver of
sovereign immunity, and submission to jurisdiction) seem so fundamental to a sovereign bond-
holder’s payment rights that they should not be changed without its consent,” and that the
likelihood that “courts will uphold such fundamental changes by exit consent as within the
intent of the parties is doubtful but remains to be seen.”); Schwarcz, Idiot’s Guide, supra note
6, at 1203. But cf. Oak Indus. v. Katz, 508 A.2d 873 (Del. Ch. 1986) (upholding a corporate R
exchange offer with exit consents).
74 See, e.g., Bolton, supra note 37, at 50 (observing, in the corporate context, that R
“[b]etween 1977 and 1990 only 73 exchange offers were successful out of 156 cases of dis-
tressed bond issuers”).
75 Id. at 60.
76 Id. But cf. Mitu Gulati & Lee C. Buchheit, How To Restructure Greek Debt 4–5 (Duke
Univ. Sch. of L., Working Paper No. 47, 2010), available at http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/
working_papers/47 (noting that Greece’s debt structure is similar to that of Ecuador and Uru-
guay insofar as it is overwhelmingly in the form of bonds).
77 Buchheit, supra note 70, at 17. R
78 The A-Team, Greece and Mud Volcanoes, ECONOMIST (May 24, 2011 1:23 PM), http://
www.economist.com/blogs/freeexchange/2011/05/greeces_debt_crisis.
79 See Bolton, supra note 37, at 60. R
80 See Schwarcz, Idiot’s Guide, supra note 6, at 1205. Although a few nations appear to R
have “master CAC” provisions that would envision cross-agreement supermajority voting, that
voting only extends across bonds issued as part of a continuing series. See Lee C. Buchheit &
Mitu Gulati, Drafting a Model Collective Action Clause for Eurozone Sovereign Bonds, 6 CAP.
MKTS. L.J., 317, 319–22 (2011).
81 See Bolton, supra note 37, at 63 (observing that there “may be hold-out behavior across R
[debt] issues”).
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ment and each indenture evidencing a bond issue includes CACs. Even if a
supermajority of the banks and a supermajority of holders of the $500 mil-
lion bonds vote to approve a debt restructuring plan, that plan would be
stymied if less than a supermajority of holders of the $300 million bonds
vote to approve.82 A debtor nation will ordinarily have many such agree-
ments evidencing its debt,83 and any failure of parties to one or more such
agreements to approve the debt restructuring plan will make such parties
hold-outs to the debt restructuring plan vis-a`-vis other creditors.
Because of these limitations, it is unlikely that CACs can ever com-
pletely resolve the hold-out problem in sovereign-debt restructuring.84
C. Analysis of the Statutory Option
Recall that under the statutory option, sovereign debtors and their credi-
tors are bound by an international convention that sets forth a process to
facilitate debt restructuring by addressing the hold-out problem and the
funding problem.85 In both the SDRM and the SDRC, the hold-out problem
is addressed by subjecting sovereign debtors and their creditors to a form of
supermajority voting on sovereign debt restructuring plans. The vote by the
overwhelming majority of similarly situated creditors would legally bind
dissenting creditors.86
Although this might at first appear to be unfair to dissenting creditors,
such supermajority voting has been proven to operate fairly in the corporate
insolvency law context.87 Because only similarly situated creditors can vote
to bind dissenting creditors, and because any outcome will bind all such
creditors alike, the outcome of a vote should benefit the claims of hold-outs
and dissenters as much as the claims of the supermajority.88 To the extent
creditors voting in the supermajority are found to have conflicts with other
82 Cf. Bosco, supra note 40, at 40; Gelpern, supra note 42, at 20–21 (noting that when R
Argentina was trying to negotiate debt restructuring terms in 2001, several hedge funds, to-
gether with groups of individual investors, refused Argentina’s proffered “draconian” restruc-
turing proposal and litigated even though seventy percent of bondholders had already agreed to
the proposal).
83 For example, Argentina had 152 types of bonds, issued in seven different currencies and
governed by the laws of eight different countries, during its 2001 restructuring. Daniel K.
Tarullo, Neither Order Nor Chaos: The Legal Structure of Sovereign Debt Workouts, 53 EM-
ORY L.J. 657, 684 (2004).
84 See Scott, supra note 59, at 129 (concluding that “[t]he insertion of collective action R
clauses in sovereign bonds is an exercise in futility”).
85 See supra text accompanying note 61. R
86 See supra text accompanying note 49. R
87 See, e.g., David A. Skeel, Jr., The Nature and Effect of Corporate Voting in Chapter 11
Reorganization Cases, 77 VA. L. REV. 461, 490 (1992) (suggesting non-consenting minority
creditors receive more than adequate protection in the Chapter 11 supermajority voting scheme
because all creditors of the same class are bound to the majority’s decision).
88 See Schwarcz, Bankruptcy Reorganization Approach, supra note 35, at 1005–06. R
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creditors voting in their class, the conflicted creditor votes could be
disallowed.89
The statutory option can also help to solve the funding problem—that a
nation would likely need to borrow new money to pay critical expenses dur-
ing the debt-restructuring process but no lender would likely be willing to
lend such funds unless its right to repayment has priority over existing debt
claims.90 An international convention can provide for the legally enforceable
granting of a first priority right of repayment to loans of new money made to
enable a nation to pay critical expenses during the debt-restructuring pro-
cess.91 Existing creditors can be protected by giving them the right to object
to a new-money loan if its amount is too high or its terms are inappropriate.92
Existing creditors should also be further protected because a nation that
abuses new-money lending privileges would likely face difficulty receiving
supermajority creditor approval for a debt restructuring plan.
The foregoing analysis of the statutory option assumes that sovereign
debtors and their creditors are bound by an international convention,93 call-
ing into question how and to what extent they would be bound.  Creditors
from nations signing the convention would be bound because, once a nation
ratifies the convention, it would be directly bound, and creditors within that
nation would be bound by the nation’s enactment of the convention’s rules
into national law.94 Most nations should want to ratify such a convention in
order to address the hold-out and funding problems, and also possibly to
reduce reliance on the painful conditionality sometimes associated with a
bailout95—as illustrated by the recent Greek unrest in response to IMF and
European Union bailout conditions.96 Although some nations nonetheless
89 Cf. 11 U.S.C. § 1126(e) (2006) (providing this).
90 See supra text accompanying notes 50–51. R
91 See, e.g., Model Convention Art. 9.
92 See, e.g., Model Convention Art. 8 (providing for notice to the debtor nation’s known
creditors and a hearing as a condition to priority lending).
93 See supra text accompanying note 61. R
94 See ANTHONY AUST, MODERN TREATY LAW AND PRACTICE 187–95 (2d ed. 2007).
95 Conditionality is not necessarily problematic. See, e.g., Morris Goldstein, IMF Struc-
tural Conditionality: How Much is Too Much? 9–10 (Peterson Inst. For Int’l Econ., Working
Paper No. 01-04, 2000), available at http://ideas.repec.org/p/iie/wpaper/wp01-4.html (noting
the IMF-imposed conditionality during the Asian financial crisis was, in many cases, reform
that domestic policymakers had been trying unsuccessfully to implement for years). Nonethe-
less, conditionality sometimes can be inappropriate or excessive. See id. at 66 (concluding that
IMF-imposed conditionality during that crisis was, at least in some cases, “excessive”).
96 See supra text accompanying notes 2–3. Cf. Ariel Buira, An Analysis of IMF Condition- R
ality (United Nations Conference on Trade and Dev., G-24 Discussion Paper Series No. 22,
2003), available at http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/gdsmdpbg2420033.pdf (discussing IMF-
imposed conditionality). Even a new-money lender for the restructuring period may, of course,
impose its own form of conditionality. See Model Convention Art. 10(1) (enabling the Super-
visory Authority to condition new-money loans); Cf. Janis A. Emmanouilidis, Adding Pieces to
the European Economic Governance Puzzle 5 (European Policy Centre Post-Summit Analysis,
Dec. 20, 2010), http://www.epc.eu/documents/uploads/pub_1207_post-summit_analysis_-_20
_december_2010.pdf (noting conditionality provisions of the IMF’s proposed ESM). But the
relatively small amount of funding needed, compared to a bailout, and the consequent greater
\\jciprod01\productn\H\HLB\2-1\hlb103.txt unknown Seq: 15  6-AUG-12 11:07
2012] Sovereign Debt Restructuring Options 109
may oppose a convention, there should be little basis to oppose the type of
convention proposed by this Article.97
Creditors from non-signatory nations also may be bound to the extent
they are parties to financing agreements governed by the law of a signatory
nation.98 Because most financing agreements with sovereigns explicitly state
their governing law,99 and New York or United Kingdom law is typically
chosen,100 the United States and the United Kingdom should have substantial
control over the convention’s effectiveness.
III. COMPARISON
The Article next generally compares the free-market option with the
statutory option. Part of this comparison is ex ante—examining how these
options can influence the behavior of nations (e.g., the extent of their mor-
ally hazardous behavior) and their creditors (e.g., the extent to which risk
premiums on financing might be affected). The other part of the comparison
is ex post—examining how effectively these options can actually influence
resolution of sovereign debt distress. The comparison will, of course, reveal
tradeoffs: an option that allows for quicker or easier debt restructuring might
lead, for example, to increases in risk premiums (although any such in-
creases must themselves be balanced against the cost increases that would
result from a default).
A. The Hold-out Problem
Both the free-market option and the statutory option address the hold-
out problem of sovereign debt restructuring, but the latter does it much more
effectively and predictably. This increase in predictability should be more
efficient from a market perspective.101 Markets do not function efficiently
when investors are uncertain what will happen.102 Also, by making it more
availability of funding sources should lessen the conditions that a new-money lender will be
able to impose.
97 See infra text accompanying notes 103–118. R
98 To the extent creditors from non-signatory nations are not parties to agreements contain-
ing governing law clauses, international law principles hold that the legal relationship between
a nation and those creditors should be governed by the law of that nation. See Derek W.
Bowett, Claims Between States and Private Entities: The Twilight Zone of International Law,
35 CATH. U. L. REV. 929, 931–32 (1986).
99 Greenwood & Mercer, supra note 28, at 106. R
100 See, e.g., Gelpern & Gulati, supra note 64, at 86–87; Rory Macmillan, The Next Sover- R
eign Debt Crisis, 31 STAN. J. INT’L L. 305, 315 (1995).
101 Cf. Douglas Gale, Standard Securities, 59 REV. ECON. STUD. 731, 731 (1992) (arguing
that investors will charge an “uncertainty premium” on unfamiliar securities).
102 In response to growing uncertainty over Greece, for example, markets around the
world have responded in kind to alternating signals of hope and despair. See, e.g., Steve Rus-
solillo, U.S. Stocks Rise on Hopes for Greece, WALL ST. J. (June 21, 2011), http://online.wsj.
com/article/SB10001424052702303936704576399194268368876.html; Asian Stocks Fall on
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likely that a debtor nation can consensually restructure its debts, the statu-
tory option would minimize the cost of bailouts.
A major source of opposition to the statutory option has been concern
that “excessive power given to debtors to cancel or reduce their debts
[would] undermine debtor countries’ ability to commit to repay their debts
and thus lead to higher borrowing costs.”103 The statutory option, however,
need not—and indeed, as contemplated in this Article, would not—give
debtor nations such excessive power. To the contrary, from the standpoint of
a given bond issue, the supermajority voting of the statutory option contem-
plated by this Article is not materially different than the supermajority vot-
ing contemplated by CACs,104 and there is “no evidence that bond issues
with CACs trade at a discount.”105 Furthermore, debtor nations that act in
bad faith could be excluded from using the statutory option.106
Although the statutory option’s ability to more predictably bind credi-
tors might increase funding costs as compared to CACs,107 any such increase
would likely be marginal because a debt restructuring under the statutory
option would be largely consensual.108 After the restructuring, the debtor na-
tion should therefore be able to borrow new money at attractive rates. In the
non-sovereign context, for example, lending rates to companies with consen-
sually restructured debt are much lower than rates charged before the re-
structuring.109 Admittedly, the lower rates in part reflect that companies have
Greek Debt Worries, FIN. TIMES, June 15, 2011, available at http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/9c
487e3e-9708-11e0-aed7-00144feab49a.html#axzz1iLOWcRGv.
103 Bolton, supra note 37, at 49. Some couch this concern as needing inefficiency in a R
debtor nation’s ability to restructure its debt as a “disciplining device to induce the sovereign
debtor to repay its debts.” Id. at 61. That concern appears misguided, however, given the other
costly consequences of default. Cf. id. at 62 (listing “loss of reputation and the ensuing in-
crease in the cost of future borrowing” as “even more important deterrents” against default).
104 But cf. infra text accompanying note 109 (observing the statutory option’s ability to R
more predictably bind creditors).
105 Bolton, supra note 37, at 61 n.12. But compare Michael Bradley et al., The Market R
Reaction to Legal Shocks and Their Antidotes: Lessons From the Sovereign Debt Market, 39 J.
LEG. STUD. 289, 301 (2010) (finding that the inclusion of collective action clauses in sovereign
bond indentures, enabling supermajority voting to change essential payment terms, did not
measurably increase sovereign borrowing costs), with Eichengreen & Mody, supra note 27, at R
262 (finding that “[c]ollective-action provisions tend to reduce borrowing costs for more
credit-worthy issuers while raising them for less credit-worthy issuers.”).
106 Cf. Model Convention Art. 3(2) (enabling the Supervisory Authority to dismiss a filing
under that Convention “for lack of good faith”).
107 The mere entry of a nation into an international debt restructuring convention should
not, however, lower the nation’s debt rating. See Schwarcz, Bankruptcy Reorganization Ap-
proach, supra note 43, at 1014 n.338 (recounting a telephone interview with the Senior Man- R
aging Director, General Counsel, and Chair of the Ratings Policy Board of Standard & Poor’s,
confirming this).
108 In contrast, a free-market debt restructuring would be less consensual insofar as CACs
are imposed through exchange offers with exit consents, prejudicing creditors who choose not
to exchange their debt claims. See supra text accompanying note 73. R
109 Regardless of its form, a key objective of debt restructuring is “enabling the timely
restructuring of debt and access to sufficient financing to sustain viable firms,” and a success-
ful restructuring will “often be accompanied by operational restructuring.” Thomas Laryea,
Approaches to Corporate Debt Restructuring in the Wake of Financial Crises 7 (Int’l Monetary
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a more conservative capital structure after restructuring their debt. After a
statutory debt restructuring, however, a sovereign debtor should have less of
a debt-service burden and thus should be less likely to default or try to uni-
laterally reduce its debt in the future.
Even if the statutory option results in a marginal cost increase, that
increase must be balanced against the much more significant cost increases
that would result from a default (or, effectively the same thing, an attempt by
a nation to unilaterally restructure its debt).110 For example, Argentine sover-
eign bond spreads rose 6,000 basis points after Argentina’s 2001 announce-
ment that it would unilaterally restructure its debt.111 Moreover, a sovereign
debt default could create a risk of systemic contagion, although it is difficult
to assess the likelihood or cost of such contagion.112 By more effectively
enabling a debtor nation to restructure its debt, the statutory option is more
likely than the free-market option to reduce the risk of default.113
In the foregoing context, it should be observed that the term “default”
can be broadly interpreted. Moody’s, for example, defines default to include
certain “distressed” debt restructurings, as well as certain debt restructurings
“imposed by the sovereign.”114 A nation’s use of the statutory option to
restructure its debt to avoid payment default would be deemed by Moody’s
to be a “default” if, as almost certainly would be the case, one or more
creditors receive in the restructuring “a new debt instrument of diminished
Fund, Staff Position Note No. SPN/10/02, 2010), available at www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/
spn/2010/spn1002.pdf. Creditors should be given an opportunity to coordinate and contribute
to restructuring proposals in out-of-court restructurings. Id. at 17–18 (citing the INSOL Inter-
national Statement of Principles for a Global Approach to Multi-Creditor Workouts). Creditor
support—shown through actual consent and implied consent through participation—combined
with operational restructuring and the avoidance of a fire sale is viewed favorably by the
market, resulting in more favorable lending terms for a restructured corporation.
110 A bailout might prevent a default, but that would have its own high costs (in the form
of cash outflows by the IMF and any nations engaging in the bailout as well as any condition-
ality imposed on the bailed-out nation). See supra text accompanying notes 1–6. R
111 Marcus Miller & Dania Thomas, Sovereign Debt Restructuring: The Judge, the Vul-
tures and Creditor Rights, 30 WORLD ECON. 1491, 1502 (2007). Although Argentina’s sover-
eign bond spreads ultimately returned to near-market levels in 2005 when its debt restructuring
was completed, id., court judgments that allowed for the seizure of Argentine bond payments
in several foreign jurisdictions effectively precluded Argentina from subsequently borrowing
in international markets. See Jonathan Stempel, NY Court Hands Argentina Setback Over Bond
Default, REUTERS (June 30, 2011), http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/07/01/argentina-
bonds-idUSN1E75T0PY20110701; see also Jane Croft, NML in UK Court Victory on Argen-
tine State Debt, FIN. TIMES, July 7, 2011, at 16 (reporting that, despite Argentina’s efforts to
negotiate with vulture funds, decisions in the UK recognizing New York court judgments con-
tinue to prevent Argentina from borrowing in international markets).
112 There was, for example, little contagion from the bond default by Argentina. But cf.
Dungey, supra note 16, at 4 (discussing the potential contagion from Russia’s bond default). R
113 Opponents to the statutory option nonetheless believe “that an administrative interven-
tion in sovereign debt restructuring is bound to be misguided [and therefore] will undermine
sovereign bond markets.” Bolton, supra note 37, at 59. The statutory option contemplated by R
this Article, however, does not contemplate administrative intervention.
114 MOODY’S INVESTORS SERVICE, MOODY’S DEFAULT DEFINITION AND ITS APPLICATION
TO SOVEREIGN DEBT 1 (2011).
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economic value in exchange.”115 Similarly, a nation’s use of the statutory
option to restructure its debt might be a restructuring “imposed by the sover-
eign,” at least from the standpoint of dissenting creditors bound by
supermajority voting. These broad definitions of default are neutral to this
Article’s comparative analysis, however, because a successful debt restruc-
turing under the free-market option would have precisely the same impact,116
whereas an unsuccessful debt restructuring under the free-market option
would, absent a bailout, lead to an actual payment default.
Finally, a nation might oppose the statutory option simply because of its
effectiveness and instead desire a bailout (by the IMF or regional nations,
such as the bailouts by the European Union and the IMF of Greece, Ireland,
and Portugal). That perverse incentive could—and as recent conditions have
shown, almost certainly will117—be addressed by imposing conditionality on
bailouts in order to make the restructuring option more attractive than a
bailout.118
B. The Funding Problem
The statutory option also addresses the other essential problem of sov-
ereign debt restructuring—that of enabling a sovereign debtor to obtain
funding to pay critical expenses during the debt restructuring process. Ab-
sent such funding, “a sovereign debt crisis coupled with an exchange rate
and banking crisis can result in substantially higher costs than a situation of
financial distress for a corporation.”119 In contrast to the statutory option, the
free-market option does not purport to address the funding problem.120
Although there are ways to attempt to address the funding problem
outside of the statutory option—and thus potentially in conjunction with the
free-market option—they may not be as effective. In any such attempt, the
debtor nation would have to grant a legally enforceable first priority right of
repayment to new-money loans made to enable it to pay critical expenses
during the debt restructuring process.121 As the discussion below shows,
115 Id. at 2; cf. Marc Jones, Rating Agencies Might Classify Greek Rollover as Default,
REUTERS, June 7, 2011, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/06/07/greece-roll
over-agencies-idUSLDE7560AX20110607 (reporting that rating agency officials had said they
“might well classify a [Greek debt] rollover as a default”).
116 Cf. Pierre-Hugues Verdier, Credit Derivatives and the Sovereign Debt Restructuring
Process 79 (Apr. 27, 2004) (unpublished LL.M. Paper, Harvard Law School), available at
http://www.scribd.com/doc/55717623/32/Collective-Action-Clauses-and-the-ISDA-Defini-
tions (observing that the use of either a collective action clause or the SDRM would be consid-
ered a debt restructuring under ISDA-governed derivatives contracts).
117 See supra text accompanying notes 95–96. R
118 Ideally, organizations and nations that might potentially provide a bailout should signal
in advance their intention to require such conditionality.
119 Bolton, supra note 37, at 58. R
120 Cf. Bolton, supra note 37, at 63 (observing that “contractual and market approaches R
[such as CACs] do not explicitly deal with DIP financing”).
121 See supra text accompanying notes 90–91. R
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however, questions remain about the extent to which any priority so granted
would be sufficient, absent an international convention, to encourage new-
money funding.
A debtor nation could, absent an international convention, grant a first
priority right of repayment either pursuant to its national law or by contract.
If the priority were granted pursuant to national law, it should be enforceable
against the debtor nation. There is a risk, however, that the debtor nation
could change its law to take away the priority after it receives the funding.122
Prior to the Great Depression, for example, many nations had issued sover-
eign debt that purported to give priority to its holders.123 None of these pri-
orities were ultimately honored, however.124 The cost of honoring the
priorities apparently outweighed the reputational cost of not honoring
them.125
A debtor nation could also attempt to contractually grant a first priority
right of repayment by including the priority in the new-money loan agree-
ment. The question then would be whether the priority was enforceable
under the law governing the loan agreement. If that law was the debtor’s
national law and such national law permitted the priority, the priority should
be enforceable against the debtor nation. However, there would still be the
aforementioned risk that the debtor nation could change its law to disallow
the priority after it receives the funding. If, on the other hand, that law were
foreign law that permitted the priority—i.e., one that enforces subordination
of existing claims without creditor consent126—the priority should be en-
forceable against the debtor nation as a matter of law; there would still,
however, be a risk that the debtor nation might breach its contract.127
Alternatively, a debtor nation could attempt to contractually create a
first priority for new-money lenders by including subordination provisions in
all of its financing agreements, thereby subordinating the creditors party to
122 Cf. Choi, supra note 63, at 17 (observing that a debtor nation could change its domestic R
law to the detriment of foreign creditors).
123 See Edwin Borchard, State Insolvency and Foreign Bondholders: General Principles
xx–xxiii (1951) (noting instances of sovereign debt issuance where default resulted in losses to
foreign bondholders).
124 Id. Borchard notes that, in some specific instances, foreign governments have provided
official aid to its bondholder citizens, particularly when “specific revenues assigned as secur-
ity for the payment of bondholders have been willfully diverted to other uses.” Id. at xxiv.
125 Borchard notes that holders of defaulted bonds from foreign sovereigns generally
“have had to rely upon their own negotiations with the debtor,” with the limited exception
where their governments have been willing to intervene. Id. at xxiii–xxiv. However, Borchard
writes that “a powerful and persuasive weapon to help bring a delinquent debtor to terms”
exists in stock exchange rules that permit refusal of a listing to any new issue by a defaulting
state. Id. at xxiv. This suggests that defaulted governments may not fear particular reputational
costs from simply not honoring their debt obligations, but rather require additional external
incentives to take on the cost of honoring their obligations.
126 United States bankruptcy law effectively allows this, for example. See 11 U.S.C. § 507
(2006).
127 Although the debtor nation would then be liable for contract-breach damages, those
damages might not have priority over other claims against the debtor nation.
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those agreements to the claims of any new-money lenders (defined as such
in those agreements). The extent to which these types of subordination pro-
visions would actually be included in a debtor nation’s financing agreements
would be subject, however, to at least the same uncertainty as would the
extent of inclusion of CACs.128
Finally, a debtor nation could effectively create a first priority for new-
money lenders by granting them collateral. However, because the debtor na-
tion could change its law to take away the collateral after it receives the
funding, granting new-money lenders collateral may not be a practical solu-
tion. Furthermore, the significance of taking domestic collateral (i.e., collat-
eral located within the nation) from a sovereign nation, including the ability
to foreclose, is itself uncertain.129
The above discussion focuses on the obligation of a debtor nation to
pay new-money priority creditors before paying other creditors and thus on
the rights and duties between the debtor nation, on the one hand, and its
creditors, on the other hand. But what would happen if a debtor nation in
fact pays new-money priority creditors pari passu with the nation’s other
creditors? Under U.S. legal principles of subordination and priority, the new-
money priority creditors would have claims against the other creditors to
recover a sufficient portion of their payments to put the new-money priority
creditors into the same position they would be in if they had been paid in
priority to the other creditors.130 This raises two legal questions: (i) whether
under the law governing the new-money loan agreement, new-money prior-
ity creditors would likewise have claims against the other creditors; and (ii)
whether international law would respect those claims. This also raises practi-
cal questions, such as whether the new-money priority creditors would be
able to obtain jurisdiction over a sufficient number of the other creditors and
whether the amounts owed by individual creditors to the priority creditors
would justify the litigation costs.
Admittedly, a debtor nation could likewise violate an international con-
vention by paying new-money priority creditors thereunder pari passu with
the nation’s other creditors. But the reputational cost of dishonoring the con-
vention, and thereby undermining the international sovereign debt restructur-
ing scheme, would presumably be high.131
128 Although a debtor nation could later attempt to use exchange offers with exit consents
to include subordination provisions, creditors might be more resistant to subordinate their
claims than to agree to adding CACs.
129 But cf. Gillian Tett, Lisbon Move May Signal the End of Risk-free Sovereigns, FIN.
TIMES, Jan. 21, 2011, at 20 (discussing Portugal’s recent decision to start posting collateral on
derivatives trades as a way to reduce borrowing costs).
130 See, e.g., AM. BAR FOUND., COMMENTARIES ON MODEL DEBENTURE INDENTURE PROVI-
SIONS 559 (1971) (explaining that although “so far as the debtor is concerned, subordinated
debt is just as truly debt as is the senior debt,” under subordination provisions “the holders of
the subordinated debt are not entitled to retain payments or distributions thereon” to the extent
they receive more than their subordinated share thereof).
131 Cf. Harold Hongju Koh, Why Do Nations Obey International Law?, 106 YALE L.J.
2599, 2599 n.2 (1997) (noting empirical evidence showing that nations almost always comply
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In short, even though a debtor nation could attempt to address the fund-
ing problem outside the statutory option, questions remain about the extent
to which those attempts would be sufficient, absent an international conven-
tion, to encourage new-money funding.
In some scenarios, debtor nations may face less of a funding problem
because another nation or group of nations may be politically or economi-
cally motivated to provide the funding. This could occur, for example, when
the debtor nation is part of a regional confederacy like the European Union,
or part of a sovereign nation, like a state within the United States, or even
possibly part of a regional sphere of interest.132 Furthermore, the IMF itself
may, in appropriate circumstances, provide that funding.133 Debtor nations
cannot always rely, however, on these types of safety nets.
Assuming a debtor nation is otherwise able to obtain new-money fund-
ing to pay critical expenses during its debt restructuring, existing creditors—
whose claims will be subordinate to that funding—might want an opportu-
nity to object to the funding. To protect those creditors, new-money funding
could be conditioned on notice to existing creditors of the proposed funding
and a hearing at which they shall have the right to object.134
CONCLUSION
As finance becomes more globally intertwined, sovereign debt defaults
will become even more likely to trigger larger systemic collapses. That, in
turn, will make many (if not most) nations too big to fail. Debt restructuring
with international law); Chris Brummer, How International Financial Law Works (and How it
Doesn’t), 99 GEO. L.J. 257, 263 (2011) (claiming that reputational constraints and market dis-
cipline are particularly effective for ensuring compliance with international financial law). The
SDRM envisioned the IMF using its standard financial sanctions on member-nations to further
ensure compliance. See SDRM Art. 13.
132 See, e.g., VINOD K. AGGARWAL & BRIGITTE GRANVILLE, SOVEREIGN DEBT: ORIGINS,
CRISES AND RESTRUCTURING 23 (Vinod K. Aggarwal & Brigitte Granville eds., 2003) (observ-
ing that during Mexico’s 1994 “Tequila Crisis,” the U.S. Government engineered a significant
bailout of Mexican sovereign debt because Mexico was an important trading partner within the
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and U.S. business interests were signifi-
cantly affected by Mexico’s debt problems).
133 Balcerowicz notes that “[a] government may be unwilling to take sufficient sociopo-
litical risks while claiming that it is incapable of introducing the necessary adjustment because
of the sociopolitical constraints [it] faces,” making it difficult to determine whether a sover-
eign debtor is actually unable to repay its debt or simply unwilling to do so. Balcerowicz,
supra note 37, at 4. Such a problem is exacerbated by situations where a “perceived danger of R
‘contagion’” exists to support additional funding in regional confederacies such as the
Eurozone. Id. at 16.
134 Cf. Model Convention Art. 8(2) (providing this protection). The Model Convention
provides that the hearing will be held before a “Supervisory Authority.” Id. Although identifi-
cation of the Supervisory Authority would ultimately be a political choice, such Authority
should ideally be neutral while not raising concerns over national sovereignty. The Model
Convention suggests the “International Monetary Fund or other neutral multilateral organiza-
tion” for this role. Id. at Art. 2(5). Whether the IMF is sufficiently neutral is beyond this
Article’s scope. Cf. Scott, supra note 59, at 126 (suggesting the IMF is not sufficiently neutral R
due to its position as a priority lender and an instrument of major economic powers).
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alternatives are therefore needed to avoid sovereign bailouts, which are not
only costly but also foster moral hazard on the part of nations that lack the
political will or ability to be fiscally responsible.
At least two options can help to minimize bailouts. Under a free-market
option, sovereign debtors and their creditors could attempt to consensually
negotiate the debt restructuring, aided by collective-action clauses and ex-
change offers with exit consents. Under a statutory option, the sovereign
debtor and its creditors would be bound by an international convention that
sets forth a process to facilitate debt restructuring.
The absence of any systematic comparison of these options has made it
difficult for scholars and other observers to thoughtfully examine, much less
agree on, which of these options is preferable. This Article provides such a
comparison in order to better inform the question of whether the free-market
option to sovereign debt restructuring should be supplemented, or even re-
placed, by an international convention that could help to facilitate the statu-
tory option.
The comparison reveals that the statutory option for sovereign debt re-
structuring should supplement the free-market option. The free-market op-
tion only addresses the hold-out problem of sovereign debt restructuring, and
indeed it addresses this problem imperfectly. In contrast, the statutory option
not only resolves the hold-out problem but also addresses the other essential
problem of sovereign debt restructuring—that of enabling a sovereign debtor
to obtain funding to pay critical expenses during the debt-restructuring
process.
This is not to say that supplementing the free-market option with a stat-
utory option would be costless. By more predictably binding creditors, the
addition of a statutory option might lead to higher sovereign borrowing costs
for financially troubled nations. Any such increase would likely be marginal,
however, because a debt restructuring under the statutory option—at least,
the statutory option contemplated by this Article—would be largely consen-
sual. Any cost increase must also be balanced against the cost increases that
would result from an outright default, which would be more likely absent the
statutory option. Furthermore, the discussion above compares borrowing
costs of financially troubled nations that do not restructure their debts. A
nation that actually restructures its debts will have less of a debt-service
burden and thus should be able to borrow new money at attractive rates.
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APPENDIX I—MODEL SOVEREIGN DEBT RESTRUCTURING CONVENTION
Chapter I: Scope, and Use of Terms
ARTICLE 1: SCOPE
This Convention applies to debt restructurings between sovereign States and
their creditors.
ARTICLE 2: USE OF TERMS
For purposes of this Convention:
(1) “Contracting State” means a sovereign State for which this Convention
is in force;
(2) “Creditor” means an entity that has a claim for payment against a Con-
tracting State;
(3) “Debtor-State” means a Contracting State that has filed for relief under
this Convention;
(4) “Plan” means a debt restructuring plan; and
(5) “Supervisory Authority” means the International Monetary Fund or
other neutral multilateral organization.
Chapter II: Invoking the Convention
ARTICLE 3: PETITION FOR RELIEF
(1) A Contracting State may invoke application of this Convention by filing
a voluntary petition for relief with the Supervisory Authority.
(2) Immediately after such a petition for relief has been filed, and so long as
such filing has not been dismissed by the Supervisory Authority for lack of
good faith, the provisions of this Convention shall apply to the relationship
between the Contracting State and its creditors.
ARTICLE 4: NOTIFICATION OF CREDITORS
Within 30 days after filing its petition for relief, the Debtor-State shall notify
all of its known creditors of its intention to negotiate a Plan under this
Convention.
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Chapter III: The Debt Restructuring Plan
ARTICLE 5: SUBMISSION OF PLAN
(1) The Debtor-State may submit a Plan to its creditors at any time, and may
submit alternative Plans from time to time.
(2) No other person or entity may submit a Plan.
ARTICLE 6: CONTENTS OF PLAN
A Plan shall:
(1) designate classes of claims in accordance with Article 7(3);
(2) specify the proposed treatment of each class of claims; and
(3) provide the same treatment for each claim of a particular class, unless
the holder of a claim agrees to a less favorable treatment.
ARTICLE 7: VOTING ON THE PLAN
(1) A Plan shall become effective and binding on the Debtor-State and its
creditors when it has been submitted by the Debtor-State and agreed to by
each class of such creditors’ claims. Thereupon, the Debtor-State shall be
discharged from any debt then in existence,135 except as provided in the Plan.
(2) A class of claims has agreed to a Plan if creditors holding at least [two-
thirds] in amount and more than [one-half] in number of the claims of such
class [voting on such Plan]136 [entitled to vote on such Plan]137 agree to the
Plan.
(3) Each class of claims shall consist of claims against the Debtor-State that
are pari passu in priority, provided that (a) pari passu claims need not all be
included in the same class, and (b) claims of governmental or multi-govern-
mental entities each shall be classed separately.
135 Alternatively, the Model Convention could except discharge of debts owed to entities
that neither had notice nor actual knowledge of the Plan.
136 The Plan can be more easily approved if this alternative is selected, but reliable notice
to creditors then becomes more important.
137 To assure fairness, the Model Convention could disallow the vote of any creditors in
the class who are found to have conflicts with other creditors of that class. See supra text
accompanying note 89. R
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Chapter IV: Financing the Restructuring
ARTICLE 8: TERMS OF LENDING
(1) The Supervisory Authority shall have the right, but not the obligation, to
lend money to a Debtor-State on such terms and conditions as the Supervi-
sory Authority deems appropriate, taking into account the Debtor-State’s use
of the loan proceeds and any objections raised by creditors pursuant to Arti-
cle 8(2).
(2) Any loan by the Supervisory Authority under Article 8(1) shall be made
only after notice to the Debtor-State’s known creditors of the intention to
make such loan and the proposed terms and conditions thereof and after a
hearing at which those creditors shall have the right to object to the loan.
ARTICLE 9: PRIORITY OF REPAYMENT
(1) Debtor-States must repay loans made by the Supervisory Authority prior
to paying any other claims.
(2) Such priority of payment shall extend to any assignee of such loans.
ARTICLE 10: NONRECOURSE BORROWING BY SUPERVISORY
AUTHORITY
(1) To finance its lending to a Debtor-State, the Supervisory Authority may
borrow on such terms and conditions as it may negotiate, provided that
neither the Supervisory Authority nor its assets shall be liable, contingently
or otherwise, for repayment of such borrowing except as set forth below.
(2) As collateral for a borrowing, the Supervisory Authority may assign as
security its right to payment under the loan made from the proceeds of such
borrowing.
(3) The Supervisory Authority may borrow on a general recourse basis in
order to make loans to Debtor-States whose financial distress results prima-
rily from factors that are [unforeseeable and] beyond their control.
Chapter V: Adjudication of Disputes
[This Chapter could follow the model of ICSID’s convention, except that
States ratifying this Convention would thereby subject themselves and their
nationals to submit all disputes arising under the Convention to the jurisdic-
tion of the adjudicatory tribunal. This Chapter would not, however, grant the
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adjudicatory tribunal jurisdiction over sovereign debt restructuring issues
that the Convention does not cover.]138
Chapter VI: Ratification
ARTICLE 11: PROCEDURES
(1) This Convention shall enter into force upon ratification or other approval
by at least [three] sovereign States.
(2) On or before ratifying or otherwise approving this Convention, each
Contracting State shall undertake such legislation or other measures as may
be necessary for making this Convention effective as national law in its
territories.
ARTICLE 12: EFFECT OF RATIFICATION
Ratification of this Convention shall be binding on each Contracting State
and on each national thereof, irrespective of contractual provisions that are
inconsistent with the provisions of this Convention or the date that a na-
tional’s claim against a Contracting State arose.
138 For example, this Chapter would not give the adjudicatory tribunal jurisdiction to de-
termine whether a foreign creditor obtaining a judgment against a Debtor-State not involving
enforcement of the Model Convention may attach assets located within that State.
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APPENDIX II—ILLUSTRATION OF HIGHLY SIMPLIFIED APPLICATION
OF MODEL CONVENTION
Country X, as a signatory to the Model Convention (or after becoming a signatory), chooses to invoke the Convention to
address its debt problem.
Country X, facing a budget shortfall that would prevent it from paying principal and interest on its debt and also maintaining
essential government services, considers its options, which might include the following:
• Raising taxes, which might do more harm than good if the economy is already slowing down.
• Accepting emergency bailout funds, but it is unclear who would provide the funding and with what conditions.
• Unilateral debt restructuring, but that would impair credibility and could make it difficult to later borrow in the capital
markets.
• Inserting collective-action clauses (CACs) into loan documents lacking them, but it is difficult to impose CACs and,
in any event, they would not operate across different bond issues or different debt sources (i.e., bank debt, foreign
government lending, and trade credit).
• Invoking application of the Model Convention.
Notification: Within 30 days of filing petition, Country
X notifies its known creditors of its intention to negotiate
a Plan under the Model Convention.
The Plan: Country X submits a Plan designating (pari
passu) classes of claims and proposed repayment terms
for each class:
• Class 1: Maturity dates extended 3 years.
• Class 2: Maturity dates extended 3 years and inter-
est rates reduced by 2.5%.
• Class 3: Principal amount reduced 10%.
• Class 4 (Foreign Government Creditor): Principal
amount reduced 5% and maturity dates extended 5
years.
Voting: Classes 1 and 2 vote to approve but Classes 3
and 4 disapprove (i.e., less than the requisite superma-
jority of Class 3 creditors approve and Class 4 Foreign
Government Creditor disapproves).
The Updated Plan: Country X revises and resubmits
Updated Plan:
• Class 1: Maturity dates extended 3 years.
• Class 2: Maturity dates extended 3 years and inter-
est rates reduced by 2.5%.
• Class 3: Maturity dates extended 5 years and inter-
est rates reduced by 2%.
• Class 4 (Foreign Government Creditor): Principal
amount reduced 5% and maturity dates extended 3
years.
Agreement: Requisite supermajority of creditors in each
Class vote for approval. The Updated Plan becomes bind-
ing on all creditors (i.e., Classes 1, 2, 3, and 4).
Financing: After discussions between Supervisory
Authority and Country X, Supervisory Authority pro-
poses to lend $Y to Country X to help maintain liquidity
and pay current expenses during debt restructuring.
Supervisory Authority notifies Country X’s known cred-
itors of intent to make loan and proposed terms and con-
ditions thereof.
Supervisory Authority holds hearing at which creditors
may object to new lending.
Taking into account Country X’s use of loan proceeds
and any objections from creditors, Supervisory Authority
agrees on revised terms with Country X.
Supervisory Authority borrows $Y on a non-recourse
basis from private or government lenders, on-lends the
loan proceeds to Country X, and pledges first-priority
right to payment from Country X as collateral to such
lenders.
Invoking Application of Convention: Country X files petition for relief with Supervisory Authority
(and Supervisory Authority does not dismiss petition for lack of good faith).
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